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ABSTRACT 
 
 We quantify how output risks are smoothed within Australia, and between 
Australia and New Zealand.  About 85 percent of shocks were smoothed within 
Australia through credit and capital markets, with fiscal policy a source of dis-
smoothing after 1992.  Risk-sharing between Australia and New Zealand was 
greater than within Europe, occurring mostly through credit markets.  With fully 
integrated financial markets between Australia and New Zealand since 1960, the 
average welfare gain would be 2.7 percent of certainty-equivalent consumption 
over 50 years, although these gains favour New Zealand. Australia’s gains are 
from the pooling of PPP risks. These potential gains were largely resolved by 
the deregulations and CER trade agreement of the early1980s.  
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 1. Introduction 
 
In recent years, there has been much debate on whether or not countries in a 
region should adopt a common currency.  One criterion for assessing the 
suitability of forming a currency union is whether there is a sufficient risk-
sharing mechanism in operation.  Although adopting a common currency is 
expected to improve the amount of risk-sharing and hence welfare gains, 
identifying the channels and quantifying the amount of risk-sharing should 
precede any practical debates on the formation of a currency union.   A 
monetary union is broader in scope, involving a common currency as well as 
integrated financial markets, uniform supervision and regulatory mechanisms 
etc.  In this paper, we will consider the implications for risk-sharing of both 
currency and monetary unions. 
It is widely assumed that the states and territories of a federal system 
such as in Australia and the United States are close to constituting an optimal 
currency area (see Mundell, 1961).  One would expect then that this would mean 
a high degree of risk-sharing within such a country, and greater than across 
countries. However, risk-sharing across national borders seems too low to be 
consistent with the predictions of standard theory.  A major implication of this 
stylised fact in international data is that market institutions do not appear to 
provide adequate mechanisms to pool risks faced by different individuals across 
national borders.  In light of this, the formation of a currency union in a region 
might be seen as a step toward developing market institutions that ultimately 
diversify income risks and hence improve welfare.  Launching a common 
currency such as the Euro can thus be viewed as a necessary precursor to 
complete monetary integration in the region.  
In the recent international business cycle literature, it has been shown 
that countries sharing identical preferences and common shocks can benefit 
from adopting a common currency or, at a minimum, a close policy co-
ordination.  Backus et al. (1992) demonstrated this in a dynamic general 
equilibrium model of two artificial economies.  Baxter and Crucini (1995) and 
Stockman and Tesar (1995) further showed that the high degree of risk-sharing 
shown in theoretical economies is robust to small changes in the utility function, 
different sources of shocks, and whether or not markets are complete.  
However, the empirical evidence on the level of risk-sharing seems to be much 
less than that implied by theory, which is one of the major puzzles of 
international macroeconomics (for example, see Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000).   
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On the empirical side, there have been numerous studies that explore 
whether and how economic fluctuations are synchronised among a set of 
countries.1  This has involved investigating the synchronisation of business 
cycles and identifying common shocks. However these studies were not 
designed to address the risk-sharing puzzle.  Another important area of research, 
which emerged to address issues like free trade agreements (FTA), globalization, 
and optimal exchange rate arrangement, has explored whether markets provide 
sufficient risk-sharing opportunities among countries believed to be closely 
related.  This literature tries to estimate the potential welfare gains from pooling 
the identified risks via capital market integration (for example, see Lee et al., 
2004). 
Coleman (2003) provides an insight that illustrates the importance of 
this strand of research.  Coleman examines Queensland and New Zealand data 
in relation to Australian aggregate data and shows that a large proportion of 
shocks to Queensland and New Zealand are region-specific.  This implies that a 
high degree of business cycle synchronization is not necessarily a prerequisite 
for a successful monetary union.  Rather, countries suffering asymmetric shocks 
but a high degree of consumption risk-sharing can form a successful monetary 
union.  As Coleman notes, a successful monetary union requires smoothing of 
shocks through (i) factor mobility, (ii) financial markets, or (iii) a fiscal 
mechanism.   
We analyse how risk-sharing takes place within Australia and between 
Australia and New Zealand.  In particular, we quantify the amount risk-sharing 
among individual states and territories in Australia as well as between Australia 
and New Zealand. Risk-sharing across countries or states can take several forms.  
For example, a resident in Melbourne can own an investment property in the 
Gold Coast while a resident in Melbourne can own shares or bonds issued by a 
Sydney-based firm (i.e. portfolio diversification of assets that generate income). 
This cross-ownership of assets is one way of pooling income risks.  A well-
developed and functioning capital market would help individuals across 
different regions share risks by diversifying their income profile. In contrast, 
labour mobility enables aggregate risk-sharing across different regions.  
Alternatively, residents in Sydney can borrow from residents in Perth 
through profit-maximising financial institutions that channel the available funds 
to those who need them most. This requires credit markets to play a 
                                                     
1 A recent study by Otto et al. (2001) explores a rich set of data and concludes that social and legal 
institutions play an important role in explaining synchronisation of business cycles. 
fundamental role in pooling income risks and smoothing consumption (i.e. in 
facilitating intertemporal trade).   
In addition to these market mechanisms that pool income risks across 
place and time, the government’s fiscal system of taxes, transfers and grants can 
help or hinder the smoothing of income risks. It is well understood at the 
aggregate level that fiscal policy through taxation can act as an automatic 
stabiliser in the short-term, which provides some insurance against income risks. 
The Commonwealth Grants Commission has aimed to achieve horizontal fiscal 
equalization across states by redistributing GST revenues and other Federal 
grants. However the design of fiscal subsidies and transfers across states may be 
such as to make them procyclical, so that they may add to aggregate risks. 
Identifying the patterns of risk-sharing and quantifying the amount of 
smoothing (or dis-smoothing) achieved by each of these mechanisms in the 
context of Australia and New Zealand is a key objective of this paper. In 
particular, we seek answers to the following questions. What are the major 
mechanisms of risk-sharing in Australia?  Do the fiscal policies of Australia’s 
federal and state governments offset or amplify idiosyncratic shocks across 
states? Is the risk-sharing achieved via market mechanisms sufficient?  How 
does the risk-sharing among various states and territories in Australia compare 
with that between Australia and New Zealand?  We can also begin to answer the 
question of whether Australia and New Zealand constitute less or more of an 
optimal currency area than Europe and other OECD countries. To answer this, 
we will focus on the proportion of income risks not smoothed by credit 
markets, capital markets and fiscal policy. When it is low, there is minimal need 
for exchange rate insurance, and the case for a common currency increases. 
When this unsmoothed proportion is high, the insurance role of exchange rate 
variations becomes particularly beneficial.  
However the real exchange rate risk (or PPP risk) could be significantly 
reduced if the countries could achieve complete financial market integration. 
Using an approach first developed by van Wincoop (1999) to measure the 
potential welfare gains from this integration, we can ask how much welfare is 
being foregone between Australia and New Zealand from incomplete financial 
market integration. Looking over 40 years since 1960, the welfare foregone 
appears to be quite large, particularly by New Zealand, with most of Australia’s 
loss due to PPP risks not shared. A crucial question is what proportion of this 
welfare foregone was resolved after 1983, when financial markets were 
deregulated, the exchange rates were floated and the Closer Economic Relations 
(CER) trade agreement was established between the two countries. Interestingly, 
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we find that most of the welfare gains from risk-sharing between Australia and 
New Zealand have already been exploited by these structural changes since 
1983. 
This paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 discusses in detail the 
analytical approach taken in this paper.  Section 3 uses the analytical framework 
shown in section 2, and examines how risk-sharing takes place within Australia.  
Section 4 extends the analysis to gain insights about a possible Australia-New 
Zealand currency union.  In section 4, we calculate the potential welfare gains 
over different time horizons from full integration of financial markets between 
the two countries.  Section 5 summarises the main results and discusses 
unresolved issues to be dealt by further research. 
 
2. Analytical Framework 
 
In this section, we briefly outline the underlying theory and then discuss the 
framework that we will use to identify the channels and amount of risk-sharing.  
The underlying theory is the perfect insurance hypothesis. That is, in a world 
with full contingent markets, consumption of individuals with identical 
preferences must co-move across all individuals and regions, and countries. 
Under complete financial markets and identical preferences with a 
single tradable good, this can be written as  
     i i wt tc cθ=    (1) 
That is, the consumption of a country/region, ci, co-moves with world 
consumption cw, where the constant θi is country specific and independent of 
state of nature.2  
Full risk-sharing also implies the existence of consumption smoothing, 
as given by the Euler equation 
    1( ) (1 ) ( )
i i i i
t t tu c r E u cδ += +   (2) 
where u is the utility function, δ is the time preference factor, and r is the riskless 
real rate of interest. However, even if financial markets are not complete and full 
risk-sharing cannot be achieved, consumption smoothing can still exist (see 
Baxter and Crucini, 1995).3 
                                                     
2 One can also add idiosyncratic taste shock, whose distribution is governed fully by the 
state of nature. 
3 Complete risk-sharing given by equation (1) implies that state contingent assets can insure risks 
from uncertain future income streams, before shocks are realised.  On the other hand, 
consumption smoothing given by equation (2) arises from the intertemporal optimisation 
While full risk-sharing is typically rejected by the data, it remains 
important to quantify the extent of risk-sharing and identify the channels 
through which (the partial) risk-sharing is achieved. Asdrubali et al. (1996) 
proposed a method of quantifying the deviations from perfect risk-sharing 
represented by equation (1). Their method utilises the simple idea that risk-
sharing can be written as the sum of  incremental sharing via capital markets, the 
fiscal system and credit markets, leaving a residual unexplained (or undiversified, 
or unsmoothed) component.  Although their method has a number of 
limitations, it provides a useful and debatable measure of the level and amount 
of risk-sharing.4  
The method builds on the simple idea that it is possible to decompose 
the cross-sectional variance of a variable y, say aggregate output (e.g. GDP for a 
country, gross state product for a state in a federal system), yielding the 
following relation:   
1 K F C Uβ β β β= + + +   (3) 
where βK, βF and βC are the fraction of shocks to the variable y smoothed 
incrementally via capital markets, by the federal fiscal system and via credit 
markets), and βU is the fraction not smoothed.5 
To make this idea operational, consider the decomposition of the 
period-by-period, cross-sectional variance in the aggregate output per capita in 
region i, yi, using the identity6 
    
i i i
i i
i i i
y inc dincy c
inc dinc c
=   (4) 
where i is an index of region, i = 1, …, N.   Note that the time index is 
suppressed to emphasise the cross-sectional nature of this method. 
The definitions of the variables and relations are as follows.  The 
income variable inc is distinguished from the output variable y in that inc is y plus 
net factor income, analogous to the relation between GNP = GDP + net factor 
income.  The variable dinc denotes disposable income and is distinguished from 
                                                                                                                              
behaviour of economic agents that trade state non-contingent assets such as bonds after a shock is 
observed, thus, intertemporally diversifying idiosyncratic consumption.  
4 See discussions in Bayoumi (1999) and Melitz and Zummer (1999) for limitations of this 
method. 
5 This decomposition presupposes that risk-sharing is incomplete. If risk-sharing is close to being 
perfect, the size of the last coefficient βU would be close to zero. 
6 Given that it is an identity composed of chains of ratios, there is no unique way of writing such 
an identity.  
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the income variable in that the difference reflects the presence of fiscal policy.  
The last variable c denotes consumption.  Conceptually, one can write the 
relations as follows: inc = y + net factor income; dinc = inc + transfers – taxes; 
and dinc – c = savings. 
Take logs and first differences of (4), and then multiply both sides of 
the equation by ∆log yi, subtract the means of the term on the left and the four 
terms on the right and take expectations to write: 
var{∆log y} = cov{∆log y, ∆log y − ∆log inc} 
+  cov{∆log y, ∆log inc − ∆log dinc}  
+  cov{∆log y, ∆log dinc − ∆log c}  
+  cov{∆log y, ∆log c} 
Dividing by the variance of ∆log y, we can derive the expression (3) and write 
the vector of coefficients β  in (3) 
  
β = 
K
F
C
U
β
β
β
β
       
 = 1var( log )y −∆
cov( log , log log )
cov( log , log log )
cov( log , log log )
cov( log , log )
y y inc
y inc dinc
y dinc c
y c
∆ ∆ − ∆  ∆ ∆ − ∆  ∆ ∆ − ∆ ∆ ∆ 
          (5) 
 
Using a panel of data for the variables defined above, the vector of 
parameters, β, can be obtained as OLS estimates from the following 
regressions7:    
, ,log log log
i i i i
t t K t K t K ty inc y uα β∆ − ∆ = + ∆ +  
 
, ,log log log
i i i i
t t F t F t F tinc dinc y uα β∆ − ∆ = + ∆ +   
                    (6)
  
, ,log log log
i i i i
t t C t C t C tdinc c y uα β∆ − ∆ = + ∆ +   
 
                                                     
7 A crucial assumption for using OLS estimator is that the regressor, ∆log y, is uncorrelated with 
the error terms. 
, ,log log
i i i
t U t U t U tc y uα β∆ = + ∆ +  
 
 
where α’s denote time fixed effects and the coefficients β’s can then be 
interpreted as weighted averages of year-by-year cross-sectional regressions.8 
Asdrubali et al. (1996) provide interpretations of the slope coefficients 
that conform with the idea shown in equation (3).  The coefficient in the first 
equation, βK, is a measure of the smoothing (or diversification) of regional 
shocks to per capita output resulting from cross-sectional ownership of claims 
to output.  The coefficient in the second equation, βF, measures the smoothing 
coming from the fiscal tax and transfer system.  The third coefficient, βC, is a 
measure of the smoothing achieved by interregional lending and borrowing. 
Finally, the coefficient βU is the unsmoothed component of the risks after the 
smoothing achieved by the first three mechanisms.   
For risk-sharing across countries (say, between Australia and New 
Zealand), we  use the cross-country  analogue of the identity (4) defined above.  
In the typical case of the absence of an international fiscal mechanism, it can be 
written as                                                                                                                                   
    
i i
i i
i i
GDP GNPGDP C
GNP C
=   (7) 
Therefore, the set of panel data equations to be estimated is 
    
, ,log log log
i i i i
t t K t K t K tGDP GNP GDPα β ε∆ − ∆ = + ∆ +  
, ,log log log
i i i i
t t C t C t C tGNP C GDPα β ε∆ − ∆ = + ∆ +   (8) 
, ,log log
i i i
t U t U t U tC GDPα β ε∆ = + ∆ +  
                                                     
8 The slope coefficient of a typical time fixed effect regression is given by 
2
1 1 1 1
ˆ ( )( ) / ( )
T N T N
i i i
t t t t t t
t i t i
x x y y x xβ
= = = =
= − − −∑∑ ∑∑ , where 
1
(1/ )
N
i
t t
i
x N x
=
= ∑ , the average of the 
regressors across N regions in period t.  Note that y is a left-hand-side variable and x is the 
regressor,  Thus, βˆ is a weighted average of the period-by-period cross sectional coefficients ˆtβ  
with weights determined by the different cross sectional variance in different periods. 
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where α’s are time fixed effects, β’s are the coefficients of interest and the 
variables are logarithms of gross domestic product (GDP), gross national 
product (GNP), and total private consumption (C) all in per capita magnitudes, 
and i indexes countries.9 
By the same logic used to obtain (3), the β’s are assumed to satisfy the 
relation 
1 K C Uβ β β= + +                 (9) 
 
The individual coefficients β can be interpreted in an analogous manner. βK 
measures the extent of smoothing (or diversification) achieved by international 
factor income flows and βC measures the extent of smoothing achieved by 
national saving, reflecting the intertemporal aspect of consumption smoothing 
through lending and borrowing. βU measures the unsmoothed component of 
consumption to a GDP shock. That is, we decompose the variance of shocks to 
GDP that are smoothed through international factor income flows (as reflected 
in the National Accounts as the difference between GDP and GNP), through 
saving (reflecting intertemporal trade), and the fraction of shocks unsmoothed.   
Note that, as there is no fiscal smoothing mechanism in risk-sharing between 
Australia and New Zealand, we exclude βF, the fraction of shocks smoothed by 
the fiscal system.   The unsmoothed fraction of shocks would typically include 
permanent shocks that cannot be smoothed via capital markets and are not 
diversifiable through the intertemporal reallocation of assets. The optimal 
response of individuals to permanent shocks would be to do little, except 
possibly for migration. 
The systems of equations given by (6) and (8) can be estimated by a 
pooled OLS or SUR (Seemingly Unrelated Regression) estimator since the 
regressors are the same across equations.  However, we allow for heterogeneity 
taking the form of different variances across the regions and correct for 
heteroskedasticity arising from the cross-sectional nature of the regression.  
Therefore, we estimate the entire equation set using weighted generalised least 
squares (GLS).10  
 
                                                     
9 We ignore government consumption in our analysis. 
10 While we did not consider potential issues arising from autocorrelation, the DW statistics under 
the null of first order autocorrelation indicated no evidence of autocorrelation.  
 
 
3. Risk Sharing in Australia 
 
This section examines the patterns of risk-sharing among various states and 
territories in Australia and quantifies the extent to which income risks are 
smoothed via market and fiscal mechanisms.  Some preliminary data analysis is 
useful at this point.   
Figure 1 shows the shares of Australia’s GDP by states and territories.  
It reveals the relative importance of each state and territory in total output 
produced in Australia. Figure 2 shows how real consumption per capita has 
grown across states and territories of Australia for the period 1983-2003.  In 
2003, ACT showed the highest level of consumption per capita (exceeding 
$26,000) in Australia, followed by NSW and Victoria.  Consumption growth was 
also much higher in ACT, NSW and Victoria among all regions.  In contrast, the 
Northern Territory and Tasmania showed the lowest level of per capita 
consumption (barely exceeding $20,000) and growth, with little difference 
between the two.   
We also report in Table 1 per capita output and consumption 
correlations across the states and territories of Australia for the period 1983 – 
2003.   Our choice of the sample period was guided by two issues.  First, since 
1983 a sequence of economic reform measures have been implemented in 
Australia including financial deregulation and labour market reforms.  Second, in 
this period one can obtain chain volume measures of price deflators at the state 
level. 
As shown in Figure 1, the two states, NSW and Victoria accounted for 
almost 60 percent of Australia’s total output.  The per capita output and 
consumption correlations within Australia show some interesting features.  First, 
the consumption correlation was higher than the output correlation for most 
pairs, and in particular on average between the three largest states, NSW, VIC 
and Queensland.  Hess and Shin (1998) examined intranational business cycle in 
the US and found evidence that a ‘quantity anomaly’ existed in intranational 
data.11  Contrary to their results, we find that the quantity anomaly was largely 
absent in intranational data for Australia. The average pair-wise correlation of 
output was 0.417 while the average consumption correlation was 0.513.  Only 
                                                     
11 This term was coined by Backus et al. (1992) and refers to the fact that in theory consumption 
correlation is much higher than output correlation while the opposite is found in international 
data. 
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for the ACT was the average bilateral output correlation with other states less 
than the average consumption correlation. Between NSW and Victoria, output 
and consumption correlations were 0.614 and 0.875, respectively, implying that a 
significant consumption risk-sharing has taken place between the two states.  
ACT’s output was more highly correlated with output in NSW and Victoria with 
values around 0.56-0.60 while its consumption correlation with each of these 
states was significantly lower at 0.389 and 0.211, respectively.  Output in South 
Australia was most highly correlated with Victoria at 0.71.  Two further features 
emerge from Table 1.  First, there was a border effect in the correlation of 
output.  Regions with high output correlations tended to be characterised by 
geographic proximity.  Second, regions well connected via communication, 
transportation and financial institutions, such as between NSW and Victoria, in 
which the two major Australian cities are located, tended to show high 
correlations.  It is also worth noting that consumption among NSW, Victoria 
and Queensland were all highly correlated with each other in the range of 0.80-
0.875.  In contrast to other states and territories, Queensland had significantly 
higher consumption correlations with other states and territories relative to 
output correlations, except for ACT.  The lower output correlation indicates 
that Queensland was subject to different kinds of income shocks, (for example, 
Queensland would be more subject to tourism shocks) but that through labour 
mobility, cross-ownership of assets, and possibly the fiscal mechanism, residents 
in Queensland had more incentives to smooth out their consumption profile 
relative to residents elsewhere. 
To implement the system of equations (6), we need measures for gross 
state product, state income, state disposable income and state consumption.  
This requires constructing data using the various sub-components of output—
factor income, transfers, taxes etc at the state level.   However, gross state 
income data available in Australia does not reflect interstate income flows, 
unlike the US data used by Asdrubali et al. (1996).12  Moreover, Asdrubali et al. 
did not distinguish between the citizens of a state and the government of the 
state.  In their study, it cannot be identified whether it is the individuals or the 
government sectors that engage in the risk-sharing.   In contrast, the focus of 
our study is consumption risk-sharing by the citizens across states and territories 
in the face of fluctuations in output produced in each region.    
                                                     
12 The gross state income data available from the ABS rather measures how residents in a state 
conduct transactions with the rest of the world.  The data only reflects disaggregated GNP, 
divided into 8 states and territories.   
The data used to estimate the equations in (6) is obtained from the ABS 
catalogues 5220.0.  The series are gross state product, gross household income, 
disposable household income and final household consumption expenditure, all 
at the state level.  All series are annual for the period 1983/84 – 2002/03, and 
chained volume measures in per capita terms.13   
Table 2 reports the estimates of consumption and income smoothing 
among six states and two territories of Australia.  For 1983/84-2002/03 at an 
annual frequency, approximately 85 percent of shocks to gross state product 
were smoothed and only 15 percent of shocks remain unsmoothed.  Capital 
markets played the most important role in risk-sharing within Australia, 
smoothing 53 percent shocks to gross state product.  An additional 32 percent 
of output shocks were absorbed by credit markets.  Surprisingly, the tax-transfer 
mechanism appeared to dis-smooth 5 percent of shocks to gross state output.14  
Our interpretation of this result is as follows. Despite (or because of) the fiscal 
equalization mechanism15 in Australia that aims to equalize fiscal capacities 
across states, fiscal mechanisms have exacerbated cross-sectional risk. The 
growth of taxes net of subsidies to households has been negatively correlated 
with the growth of state product.  Due to the complexity of the tax and subsidy 
system, it is not easy to determine the main cause of this negative correlation, 
but we can conclude that the fiscal design is sub-optimal from the point of view 
of risk smoothing across states.    
We also split the sample into two sub-periods: 1983/84 – 1991/92 and 
1992/93 – 2002/03.  The most noticeable change in the estimates is that credit 
market smoothing became as important as capital market smoothing since 
1992/93.  This could be a positive result of the financial market deregulations 
that began in the mid 1980s. Credit markets absorbed almost 48 percent of 
shocks to state output in the later period, but only 15 percent of shocks in the 
earlier one.   This implies that intertemporal smoothing via credit markets 
became a more important channel to smooth output shocks since 1992. The 
role of fiscal policy in dis-smoothing worsened after 1992 (from an insignificant 
                                                     
13 Data before 1989/90 is only available from print sources.   
14 Note that unlike Asdrubali et al. (1996), our data includes all forms of taxes, subsidies and 
transfers at both state and federal levels. 
15 The Commonwealth Grants Commission, set up in 1933, distributes grants to states according 
to a fiscal formula. Most of the revenue comes now from the GST. The goal of the redistribution 
is horizontal fiscal equalization so that “State governments should receive funding from the 
Commonwealth such that if each made the same effort to raise revenue from its own sources and 
operated at the same level of efficiency, each would have the capacity to provide services at the 
same standard”. 
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-2.57 to a significant -6.71 percent). It is possible that GST revenues going to 
state governments after 2000 have contributed to the worsening. The total 
fraction of output risks remaining unsmoothed was smaller (by about 5 
percentage points) after 1992/93.   
For the United States, Asdrubali et al. (1996) found that 63 percent of 
shocks to per capita gross product of individual states were smoothed through 
transactions on markets, 13 percent by the federal tax-transfer and grant system, 
and 25 percent remained unsmoothed.  In the US, the capital market was found 
to be most important as a market mechanism for sharing risks.  Although the 
data used for Australia differ in definition and emphasis to some extent from 
that used by Adrubali et al. (1996) for the US, one should be cautious in making 
comparisons. 
 
4. Risk Sharing between Australia and New Zealand 
 
Recently, the possibility of a monetary union between Australia and New 
Zealand has received growing media attention with the leaders of the two 
countries expressing interest in developing even closer economic relations, 
which could potentially lead to a realization of a monetary union.  There are a 
number of studies that have sought to answer whether Australia and New 
Zealand would be better off forming a currency union.   
 Grimes (2000) presented a case for forming a single currency across the 
Tasman Sea, which he dubbed an “ANZAC” dollar.16 Crosby and Otto (2002) 
and Hall et al. (1998) examined the extent of business cycle synchronisation 
between the two countries (and also with the US).  Their evidence indicates that 
the two economies were not synchronised enough to warrant a transition to a 
currency union.  This section takes an alternative approach to examining this 
issue in the framework of risk-sharing.  Using the same analytical framework 
used to quantify the patterns of risk-sharing within Australia, we evaluate 
whether the amount of risk-sharing taking place between the two countries was 
comparable to that taking place within Australia and within Europe.  As the 
economic size of New Zealand is about one seventh of Australia, it would be 
the fifth largest state, pushing South Australia to the sixth position in Australia 
under a common currency.  
There are similar studies for the European monetary integration in 
recent years.  Sørensen and Yosha (1998) examined the EU countries for the 
                                                     
16 Crosby and Otto (2002) proposed an alternative name for a single currency, ‘Kemu’, Kiwi plus 
Emu. 
period 1966-90 and found that only 40 percent of the shocks to GDP were 
smoothed and factor income flows did not smooth income across countries.  
The bulk of income and consumption smoothing among the EU and OECD 
countries was achieved through the intertemporal channel, via credit markets.  
Their finding implies that capital income smoothing across countries, reflected 
in factor income flows, was negligible, and suggest that further integration of 
capital markets should be a high priority in the process of monetary unification.  
Melitz and Zummer (1999) also examined the extent of risk-sharing in Europe 
and found similar results.  The common conclusion from this research is that 
financial integration is far from complete with about 60 percent of the total 
income risks remaining unsmoothed.   
The data we use are taken from the ABS National Accounts for Australia 
and International Financial Statistics for New Zealand.  All data are annual, real and 
in per capita terms.  While Sørensen and Yosha (1998) also used annual data to 
examine risk-sharing among the European countries, Kim et al (2005) used the 
data taken from the Penn World Tables to examine risk-sharing in East Asia.  
Our dataset is consistent with that used by Sørensen and Yosha in source and 
definition.  However, we have also considered how using a dataset that adjusts 
for purchasing power parities, such as the PWT data, leads to different results.17 
In the next section, where we estimate the potential gains from complete 
                                                     
17 We show that when the data used are in local currency units, the role of factor income 
transfers is negligible at less than 1% in all cases with large standard errors.  Moreover, 
about 50% of the shocks still remain unsmoothed between Australia and New Zealand.  
On the other hand, when we use data adjusted for purchasing power parities, we get a 
significant estimate of capital market smoothing of more than 10% of the shocks, 
though the smoothing achieved by credit markets is lowered substantially to about 10%. 
Moreover, the percentage of shocks that still remains unsmoothed rises to 
approximately 80%.   
We interpret this difference as follows.  Since the PWT dataset accounts for 
the volatility of exchange rates and relative prices, it reduces the proportional need for 
smoothing through the capital and credit market channels.  Thus βu increases in size. 
The difference in the amount of risk-sharing due to the use of this alternative dataset 
potentially highlights one source by which risk-sharing can be improved.  That is, 
eliminating risks due to real exchange rate uncertainty among member countries could 
lead to an improvement in risk-sharing by as much as 30% of total income shocks. 
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consumption risk-sharing between Australia and New Zealand, we do need to 
use the PWT data.  
Table 3 reports estimation results for the slope coefficients.  More than 
60 percent of income shocks remained unsmoothed for the whole sample 
period, 1960-2002.  This amount of unsmoothed risks at the annual frequency 
was comparable to that among European Community (EC) countries 
considered by Sørensen and Yosha (1998), who found that 60 percent of shocks 
remained unsmoothed during the period 1966-1990.   For a better comparison 
with the results of Sørensen and Yosha and to examine if there is any change in 
the historical pattern, we consider two sub-samples: 1960-1980 and 1981-2002.  
The amount of risks left unsmoothed was about 75 percent in the first sub-
sample, but only 52% in the second.    
Also, the degree of risk-sharing across the Tasman Sea was significantly 
larger than risk-sharing found among East Asian countries and the ASEAN 
group.  Kim et al. (2005) found that only 20 percent of shocks were smoothed 
in East Asia.  It is to noteworthy that risk-sharing between the two countries has 
improved to a noticeable degree during the later period, 1981-2002, a result 
consistent with what we shall obtain in the next section. However the amount of 
risk-sharing is still far less than that achieved within a country with a federal 
system such as the US and Australia.  
Consistent with the studies for European and East Asian countries, 
capital markets played at best a small role in smoothing shocks.  For the entire 
sample period, about 6 percent of shocks were smoothed via capital markets, 
and the role of capital markets in smoothing output shocks did improve in the 
later period.  Factor income transfers across national borders seem to have 
played only a minor role in smoothing income risks.  
The bulk of income risk smoothing between Australia and New 
Zealand was achieved via credit markets.  Intertemporal trades in the region 
smoothed about one third of total income risks.  During 1981-2002, an even 
larger fraction of output shocks was smoothed by credit markets (about 36 
percent). Given the integration of the banking system across the countries, this 
result is not surprising. That credit markets were most important in smoothing 
income risks is consistent with the results obtained in the previous studies 
mentioned above. 
Given that previous studies (for example, Crosby and Otto, 2002) find 
that Australia’s business cycles are more synchronised with the US business 
cycles rather than with New Zealand business cycles, we also consider risk-
sharing between Australia and the US.   Our results from estimation of the 
system of equations (8) indicate that the amount of income risks unsmoothed at 
the annual frequency over 1960-2002 is much higher between Australia and the 
US (about 74%) than between Australia and New Zealand (61%).18   One 
interesting result is that capital market smoothing with the US was quite 
negligible prior to 1980 but became quite important (at 18%) during 1981-2002.  
This is at stark contrast with our results for Australia and New Zealand as well 
as previous studies on Europe and East Asia, all of which do not find such a 
sizable estimate of capital market smoothing across countries. In terms of the 
total fraction of income shocks left unsmoothed, the degree of risk-sharing 
between Australia and the US was even less than Europe.      
While the degree of business cycle synchronisation between Australia 
and the US seems to have been larger than that between Australia and New 
Zealand, our estimates show that the risk-sharing between Australia and New 
Zealand was far greater than that between Australia and the US.   Contrary to 
the findings from previous studies that examined the extent of business cycle 
synchronisation and concluded that there is no strong case for a currency union 
between Australia and New Zealand, our results show that in terms of the risk-
sharing criterion, Australia and New Zealand are more suited to forming a 
currency union than even among the members of the Euro zone.   
 
5. Potential Welfare Gains from Risk-sharing between Australia and New 
Zealand 
 
Although Asdrubali et al.’s procedure allows joint identification of risk-sharing 
through credit, private insurance (via capital markets), and public transfers as 
smoothing mechanisms, it cannot answer the following question: what are the 
potential welfare gains from perfect risk-sharing over time achieved by complete 
financial market integration?  In this section, we now turn to this question under 
the assumption that country-specific income shocks are perfectly diversified and 
consumption streams are smoothed out across countries.  We quantify the 
amount of potential welfare gains due to perfect smoothing of income risks 
achieved through financial market integration at different time horizons.19   
We follow van Wincoop (1999) and compute the potential welfare gain 
when Australia and New Zealand perfectly pool their income risks with each 
                                                     
18  The US data were also taken from the International Financial Statistics.  Our estimation results for 
Australia- US risk-sharing are not reported in detail but are available upon request. 
19 That is, we ignore the income smoothing across regions/countries via credit markets and 
government transfers.  
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other.  van Wincoop provides a technique for computing the potential welfare 
gains from risk-sharing across countries in a region when there is full integration 
of financial markets.  The results obtained are quite consistent with those using 
a technique developed in the presence of growth uncertainty by Athanasoulis 
and van Wincoop (2000). While their technique requires estimating a growth 
regression with a set of informational variables, our computation can be 
implemented if we assume the endowment process is a random walk with drift.20 
The theoretical framework outlined in this section follows van Wincoop 
(1994, 1999).  We assume that there are 2 countries with identical preferences, 
complete financial markets, and residents in each country i maximize the 
following utility function 
    
1
0
1
T
t it
i
cU E e dt
γ
β
γ
−
−= −∫    (10) 
where T is the time horizon, γ is the risk aversion parameter and ci is aggregate 
consumption per capita. The per capita endowment yi follows a random walk 
with drift 
    it i it i it idy y dt y dµ σ η= +   (11) 
where η is a standard Brownian motion and ρ = dηiηk (i ≠ k) is the correlation 
between innovations of endowment growth rates of the two countries. 
Under autarky, domestic consumption is equal to the domestic 
endowment and expected utility can be written as 
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where ν = 2( 1)( 0.5 )i iβ γ µ γσ+ − − . 
Under complete financial markets, country-specific risks are maximally 
diversified and consumption in each country is proportional to the global 
endowment (with real variables from both countries adjusted for PPP 
variations) 
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20 Standard unit-root tests cannot reject that GDP and consumption are both I(1) processes with a 
drift component. 
where αi is the ith country’s share of the global endowment. With complete 
financial markets and the endowment processes in (11), consumption growth in 
either country follows approximately a random walk with variance  
    2 2 2 2 21 1 2 2 1 2 1 22Wσ α σ α σ α α ρσ σ= + +  (14) 
As a benchmark, consider the symmetric case studied by van Wincoop (1999) 
and Kim et al (2005), where σ1=σ2=σ  and  α1=α2=0.5. In this case, 
consumption growth risk for each country becomes  
2
2 (1 )
2W
σσ ρ= +  
and so when ρ=1, there are no risk-sharing gains from financial integration for 
either country, and when ρ =-1, there is complete diversification with no risk. 
However, in the more realistic case where σ1>σ2, the country with the lower 
consumption growth risk may incur a risk-sharing loss when ρ<1 i.e. σ2W>σ22, 
and even when ρ=-1.21  If α1≠α2, consumption growth risk remains after 
financial integration even when ρ=-1. Our calculations are based on the more 
realistic specification given by (14). 
The welfare gain/loss to the ith country from complete financial 
integration can be measured by changes in certainty-equivalent consumption per 
year, which van Wincoop (1999) shows as 
Gaini ≈ 
( )2
( )
0.5 1 ( )
1
i i
i i
T r
i
i i T r
i i
d eT r
r e
µ
µ
γ σ µµ
− −
− −
 − − − − − 
  (15) 
where 20.5i i iµ µ γσ= −  is the risk-adjusted growth rate and 2 2 2i W idσ σ σ= −  
is the change in the variance of consumption growth rate when moving from 
autarky to the complete markets economy. The horizon, T, matters for the 
calculation of the gains because the stochastic process for consumption in (11) 
is assumed to be a random walk with drift. 
Estimating potential welfare gains from complete risk-sharing requires 
the following parameter values: the risk-free interest rate, the rate of relative risk 
aversion, and the standard deviation of country endowment growth, and the 
correlation between endowment growth rates.  Consistent with van Wincoop’s 
(1999) calculation, we use consumption rather than output data to measure the 
endowments. This implies that risk-sharing already occurs to a certain extent, 
                                                     
21  For a more general case where α1 ≠ α2 and σ1>σ2, the country with a lower variance may incur a 
risk-sharing loss if 2 21 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 2( ) 2 (1 )α σ α σ α α σ σ ρ σ+ < − + . 
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rather than moving from financial autarky to complete risk-sharing. Hence, what 
we measure is the welfare gains that arise when countries move from the current 
state to complete markets.   
While the consumption used in the theory is tradable consumption, we 
use total private consumption as it is hard to accurately separate tradable and 
non-tradable consumption.   Further, for an analysis of the real consumption 
risk shared across countries, we need PPP-adjusted measures of real 
consumption for each country. Using annual data from the Penn World Tables 
for the period 1960–2002, the average rate of growth of PPP-adjusted 
consumption per capita is 5.9 percent in Australia and 5.4 percent in New 
Zealand. This is considerably higher than the average real consumption growth 
rates per capita in local currency (2.0 and 1.5 percent respectively), which 
reflects the gains from PPP improvements. The standard deviations of the PPP-
adjusted growth rates are 2.9 and 4.2 percent respectively, again much higher 
than the local currency counterparts (1.5 and 3.7). The correlation between the 
two countries’ consumption growth rates was 0.15. The risk-free interest rate we 
use is the average computed from CPI based inflation rates and long-term bond 
rates from 1960-2000.  For Australia, it is 3.1 percent annually, and for New 
Zealand it is 1.5 percent. The risk aversion parameter used by van Wincoop 
(1999) was 3 and so we used this value. The average shares of regional 
consumption over the forty years were close to 50 percent with the PPP-
adjusted data. 
Table 4 reports implied potential welfare gains from complete risk-
sharing over a horizon of 10 to 50 years.  The gains are quite significant on 
average, but much more so for New Zealand. Using PPP-adjusted data, the gain 
in permanent consumption to New Zealand after 10 years is 0.8 percent, rising 
to 4.9 percent after 50 years. The welfare gains to Australia from complete 
integration of financial markets with New Zealand are one tenth those of New 
Zealand, measured as a 0.1 percent increase in permanent consumption over 10 
years, but rising to 0.5 percent after 50 years.  
A significant proportion of the gains we detect appear to come from 
the sharing of PPP risks. This becomes apparent when the welfare analysis is 
repeated using real consumption per capita data from the OECD’s Main 
Economic Indicators. With this data, real exchange rate risk is ignored, and so 
the measured welfare gains must come from sources other than the pooling of 
PPP risk. Table 4(b) reports these gains, which are much smaller than the results 
we obtained with PPP-adjusted consumption, and indeed negative in the case of 
Australia.  From the average welfare effects, it would appear to be zero-sum 
game. This suggests that the Australian benefits from complete financial market 
integration with New Zealand would arise largely from the pooling of PPP risks. 
Finally we compared the measured welfare gains during the fixed 
exchange rate period from 1960 to 1983, and the flexible exchange rate period 
from 1984 to 2000. This latter period was associated with considerable financial 
market deregulation and the introduction of the CER trade agreement, which 
led to a 500% expansion of two-way trade in goods and services between the 
countries, as well as substantial increases in two-way investments. These 
structural changes would be expected to have yielded considerable welfare gains. 
Table 4(c) reports the gains for the two periods. The results suggest that most of 
the gains we identified over the whole sample arose from the more regulated 
fixed exchange rate period. For both countries, only minor potential welfare 
gains of 0.5 percent on average remain unexploited. 
 
6. Conclusion and Further Research 
 
This paper examined how risk-sharing has taken place within Australia and 
between Australia and New Zealand.  Using the framework developed under the 
hypothesis of perfect insurance, we decomposed the cross sectional variance of 
output into components smoothed by market mechanisms, the fiscal 
mechanism and unsmoothed components. Our key findings are as follows. 
First, the share of income risks smoothed within Australia is quite 
consistent with results for the US, in the sense that almost 85 percent of shocks 
are smoothed.  Since 1992, credit and capital markets have contributed equally 
to risk-sharing in Australia , while capital markets play a more important role in 
the US. We find that fiscal mechanism has been counterproductive to risk-
sharing in Australia, particularly since 1993. This suggests that the 
Commonwealth’s fiscal equalization mechanism across states needs to be 
reconsidered in the context of its implications for inter-state risks. 
Second, we find that, unlike previous studies that explored business 
cycle synchronisation as the criteria for assessing the suitability of a currency 
union between Australia and New Zealand, our results show that Australia and 
New Zealand would constitute more of an optimum currency area than even the 
EU countries when the degree of risk-sharing is used as the main criterion.   
Third, we find that should financial markets become fully integrated 
between Australia and New Zealand, the welfare gains appear to be asymmetric 
with New Zealand standing to gain much more than Australia. Most of the gains 
to Australia seem to arise from the pooling of  PPP risks. However most of 
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these potential gains appear to have been successfully resolved after the floating 
of the exchange rates, the deregulation of financial markets and the CER trade 
agreement in the early 1980s. 
Our assessment of the current state of intranational and international 
risk-sharing is as follows.  First, there remains uninsurable idiosyncratic 
country/region specific risk in non-traded sectors, and in wage and labour 
markets.   Second, the integration of capital markets is still incomplete even 
among developed countries.  An alternative interpretation is that home bias 
remains a robust feature even when financial markets are fully developed and 
transactions costs are negligible. Third fiscal mechanisms in Australia need to be 
redesigned to correct their risk-worsening features. Our framework can be 
extended to a deeper investigation of the horizontal fiscal equalisation between 
states.  Currently, the Commonwealth Grants Commission’s pursuit of cross 
subsidisation in the allocation of GST revenues across states and territories is a 
major political and economic issue that has received intense political and media 
scrutiny.  While Harding et al. (2002) examined this issue using micro-level 
simulations, a macro approach is needed to explore how risk-sharing and 
welfare gains could be improved.  Fourth, our results indicate that there is scope 
for creating new market mechanisms for sharing income and consumption risks.  
In this regard, policymakers could give serious consideration to Robert Shiller’s 
(1993) proposal for establishing a new class of markets that trade claims on 
aggregate income and service flows. 
Further research may include extending the analytical framework used 
in this paper to incorporate the openness in physical and financial trades, as well 
as labour mobility both interstate and across countries (immigration).  An 
exciting area to pursue would be to consider the effects of risk-sharing across 
generations, i.e. intergenerational risk-sharing, to examine the effects of social 
security and institutions (see Shiller, 1999).    
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Figure 1: Share of GDP by States and Territories, 1983/84 – 2002/03 
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Figure 2: Growth of per capita Consumption across Australia, 1983/84 – 2002/03 
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Table 1:  Output and Consumption Correlations Across States and Territories in 
Australia, 1983/84 – 2002/03 
Output 
 ACT NSW VIC QLD SA WA TAS 
NSW 0.561 1.000      
VIC 0.599 0.614 1.000     
QLD 0.455 0.498 0.557 1.000    
SA 0.605 0.514 0.706 0.329 1.000   
WA 0.404 0.313 0.420 0.319 0.480 1.000  
TAS 0.566 0.422 0.514 0.494 0.625 0.697 1.000 
NT 0.450 0.432 0.149 0.190 0.279 -0.107 0.372 
Pair-wise Average: 0.417 
Consumption 
 ACT NSW VIC QLD SA WA TAS 
NSW 0.389 1.000      
VIC 0.211 0.875 1.000     
QLD 0.256 0.841 0.800 1.000    
SA 0.296 0.727 0.631 0.605 1.000   
WA 0.309 0.826 0.792 0.792 0.613 1.000  
TAS 0.243 0.767 0.675 0.701 0.748 0.847 1.000 
NT 0.094 0.207 0.268 0.402 0.420 0.213 0.243 
Pair-wise Average: 0.513 
N.B. The statistics are computed using the growth rates of per capita variables. 
 
Table 2: Household income and consumption smoothing within Australia (%) 
 1983/84 – 2002/03 1983/84 – 1991/92 1992/93 – 2002/03 
Capital markets (βK) 52.96* (6.60) 59.12* (11.31) 48.30* (7.97) 
Fiscal system (βG) -4.93* (1.65) -2.57 (2.76) -6.71* (1.97) 
Credit market (βC) 32.44* (9.97) 14.82 (14.25) 47.79* (13.21) 
Not smoothed (βU) 14.53* (6.10) 16.61* (7.62) 11.35 (9.47) 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are White’s heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.   The point estimates 
with an asterisk are statistically significant at the level of 5% or less. 
 
Table 3: Income and consumption smoothing between Australia and New Zealand (%) 
 1960- 2002 1960-1980 1981-2002 
Factor income flows (βK) 5.99* (0.75) 4.14 (2.62) 8.91* (1.11) 
National borrowing-lending 
(βC) 
30.70* (3.29) 25.49* (9.21) 35.68* (6.82) 
Not smoothed (βU) 61.26* (5.98) 74.38* (12.50) 51.67* (2.87) 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are White’s heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.  The point estimates 
with an asterisk are statistically significant at the level of 5% or less. 
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Table 4: Potential Gains from Risk Sharing between Australia and New Zealand 
 
(a) Using PPP-adjusted consumption (PWT; 1960-2000) 
Parameters r µ σ γ σw ρ Shares: α,1−α 
Australia 3.1% 5.9% 2.9% 3 2.7% 0.15 50.5% 
New Zealand 1.5% 5.4% 4.2% 3   49.5% 
        
Welfare Gains T=10 T=20 T=30 T=40 T=50   
Australia 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 0.4% 0.5%   
New Zealand 0.8% 1.7% 2.7% 3.7% 4.9%   
Average 0.4% 0.9% 1.5% 2.1% 2.7%   
Note: In the PWT6.1 table for Australia, real consumption growth per capita jumps inexplicably to 24% in 1989, which 
distorts the results. We substituted the average growth of 5.9% for this year. 
 
(b) Using real consumption (MEI; 1960-2000) 
Parameters r µ σ γ σw ρ Shares: α,1−α 
Australia 3.1% 2.0% 1.5% 3 2.9% 0.15 53% 
New Zealand 1.5% 1.5% 3.7% 3   47% 
        
Welfare Gains T=10 T=20 T=30 T=40 T=50   
Australia -0.4% -0.8% -1.2% -1.6% -2.0%   
New Zealand 0.4% 0.9% 1.3% 1.7% 2.1%   
Average 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1%   
 
(c) Fixed versus Flexible Exchange Rate Periods (PWT; 1960-1983 and 1984-2000) 
Fixed 
Welfare Gains T=10 T=20 T=30 T=40 T=50   
Australia 0.1% 0.2% 0.4% 0.5% 0.7%   
New Zealand 1.3% 2.8% 4.6% 6.5% 8.6%   
Average 0.7% 1.5% 2.5% 3.5% 4.7%   
Flexible 
Welfare Gains T=10 T=20 T=30 T=40 T=50   
Australia 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2%   
New Zealand 0.2% 0.3% 0.5% 0.6% 0.7%   
Average 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 0.4% 0.5%   
 
 
 
